Never Again: Variables That Lead To Genocide

Abstract: Genocide is a horrific concept that has continued to occur throughout history, despite the world declaring ‘never again’. There are a number of variables that can combine to lead to genocide, including community division, stereotyping, prejudices, volatile situations, social influence, deindividuation, propaganda, rationalisation of hatred and violence, aggression and international intervention. From a humanitarian viewpoint it is essential that the world learns from past genocides such as Rwanda, and prevent this from occurring again.

Throughout history the world has been horrified by genocides: the Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust and genocides in Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur. Following the Holocaust, members of the United Nations signed the Genocide Convention designed to prevent future genocides and the world declared 'never again' (Sternberg, 2003; Power, 1998). Yet it did happen again, more than once. It has been estimated that during the 20th century approximately 188 million people were killed by war, genocide, tyranny and manmade famine (World Watch Institute, 2007). This leads to the questions 'why do genocides occur?' 'What factors contribute to such a situation?' There is not one simple answer, rather a number of factors that can combine to create genocide. Through examining the social psychological variables the world can gain a better understanding of how genocides arise, and hopefully develop methods to prevent future atrocities from ever occurring. The mass killings in Rwanda in 1994 are one example of the complexity of genocide. In 100 days approximately 800 000 people were killed, most of which were the Tutsi minority, although many of the Hutu majority also died (Smith, 1998; Stansell, 2007; Sternberg). That this was allowed to happen, both by the Rwandans themselves, and the international community, attest to the fact that there is no simple answer as to how genocide can occur. The Rwandan genocide was not a simple case of tribal warfare (Smith). A concept map of these variables is presented in Appendix A.

Community Division: Stereotyping and Prejudices
Stereotyping and the forming of prejudices can be viewed as a normal part of learning and human development (Baumeister & Bushman, 2008; McCauley, Sitt & Segal, 1980). It doesn’t always lead to violence or war, however in its extreme it is a variable that can contribute to genocide. One of the basic forms of stereotyping and prejudice is ethnic stereotyping which can include ethnocentrism which involves stereotype characterizations that not only describe, but evaluate an ethnic group (McCauley, Sitt & Segal). These evaluations are based on judging groups according to their differences to the initial group’s norms (McCauley, Sitt & Segal). In the case of the Rwandan genocide there was a clear distinction between and prejudice amongst, two tribal groups – the Hutu and Tutsi people (Feil, 1998; Smith, 1998; Stansell, 2007). The mistrust and fear that breeds when stereotyping and prejudices are rampant only serve to widen the gap between ethnic groups and worsen tensions (Mamdami, 2007; Reeves, 2007; Rummel, 1995). Stereotyping can lead to discrimination – an in-group (the group one belongs to) versus out-group (the group others belong to) mentality (Baumeister & Bushman).

A Volatile Situation
Genocides do not occur in peaceful, prosperous nations, rather in those that are troubled with civil war or rebellion and often economic difficulties (Mamdami, 2007; Rummel, 1995). Rummel argues that regimes based on a totalitarian dimension are much more likely to lead to war and genocide than democratic regimes.
Feil (1998) chronicled part of the troubled history between the two Rwandan tribal groups. Rwanda, or Ruanda-Urundi as it was then known, was made a League of Nations Protectorate, governed by Belgium in 1919, and in 1926 Belgium introduced ethnic identification cards that differentiated between the tribal groups. In 1959 the Tutsi king died, resulting in a Hutu rise and the killings of hundreds of Tutsi people. In 1962 Ruanda-Urundi became Rwanda as it gained its independence and the Hutu majority government came to power, bringing about more Tutsi killings. In 1963 and 1967 the killings continued and in 1973 the Tutsi people were restricted to 9% of available public service jobs whilst also being purged from universities and other institutes. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was formed in 1986 and in 1989 world market coffee prices collapsed, destroying the Rwandan economy and increasing tensions between the two groups. In 1990 the RPF invaded Rwanda, were pushed back to the border through French and Zarian assistance and hundreds of Tutsi civilians were killed as reprisal for the attack. From 1990 to 1994 various cease-fire agreements were established and continuously broken. The Rwandan army began equipping and training militias and paramilitary organisations during 1990 and 1991. In 1992 Egypt and South Africa signed $6 million and $5.9 million agreements respectively, with the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) for small arms, mortars, rockets, grenades and mines. In 1993 UN peacekeeping forces were approved and deployed but in October of the same year a coup d’etat occurred causing hundreds of refugees to flee the country. On April 6, 1994 the Rwandan and Brundi presidents were assassinated and the country descended into chaos.

Social Influence and Deindividuation
Social influence can play a large role in genocide through pressure for individuals to conform to a larger group’s beliefs and actions, even to the extent that civilians will participate in killings themselves (Feil, 1998; Smith, 1998; Sternberg, 2003). Social influence has a historical perspective in that humans have been more likely to survive if they were part of a group rather than on their own (Baumeister & Bushman, 2008). Normative influence can be seen in genocide when individuals conform not only to be accepted as part of a group but to avoid reprisals and negative consequences for themselves (Reeves, 2007; Smith; Sternberg). During the Rwandan genocide Hutu extremist not only killed Tutsi people, but also moderate Hutu who were, wether accurately or not, portrayed as associating and collaborating with the Tutsi, or who failed to clearly align themselves with the majority (Sternberg; Feil).
Sternberg (2003) lists strategies that governments and military groups use to achieve their means during a genocide: intensive, extensive propaganda – often through false stories to generate hatred; infusion of hatred and its resultants as an integral and necessary part of societal mores – the normalising of feelings of hatred; emphasis on indoctrination of youngsters in school and through extracurricular groups; the importance of obeying orders; diffusion of responsibility – no one is left feeling solely responsible, rather they are small parts of a larger machine; calls to and rewards for action; threats and punishment for non-compliance; public examples of compliance and non-compliance; system of informers to weed out fifth-columnists – usually secret police; and the creation of an authoritarian cult of a leader.
The diffusion of responsibility is linked to deindividuation – individuals lose their sense of individuality and become part of the larger group – they develop the mob mentality (Baumeister & Bushman)

Communication: Propaganda and Rationalisation
Much of this social influence can occur through persuasion – propaganda and the use of fear – minority groups are demonised and an ‘us or them’ style message is broadcast – one’s group must destroy their enemies before they are destroyed themselves (Baumeister & Bushman, 2008; Feil, 1998; Reeves, 2007). In Rwanda, radio broadcasts fuelled hatred and the Tutsi were often referred to as cockroaches and vipers (Feil; Smith, 1998). Hutus were instructed to ‘fill the rivers of the country with the Tutsi dead’ (Feil, p5) and it was claimed that Tutsis were planning on slaughtering innocent Hutu (Smith). In Germany, during the Holocaust the Jews were demonised through movies, broadcasts, books and posters as being greedy, cunning and dangerous (Herf, 2006; Varvin, 2005; Weindling, 1997). Through propaganda individuals are taught that hatred towards the target group is justified and that they in fact have a responsibility to act on these feelings (Sternberg, 2003).

Aggression
Genocide involves both hostile, or impulsive, aggression and instrumental, or premeditated aggression (Baumeister & Bushman, 2008). As well as active aggression – direct behaviour that harms others – passive aggression can also be involved, where people are harmed through the lack of behaviour (Baumeister & Bushman). Genocide often not only involves the torture and murder of people but also the withholding of vital supplies including food, water, medication, shelter and basic safety and protection (Mamdami, 2007; Reeves, 2007; Sternberg, 2003). Whether governments are openly undertaking the genocide killings or not, the militias are usually state-sponsored, with both financial, manpower and weapons assistance being provided (Mamdami; Reeves; Rummel, 1995)
Peters (2007) argues that genocide is ‘essentially Darwinian’ in that throughout history tribes or groups have sought to eliminate other groups for their own safety – survival of the fittest.

International Intervention
International intervention can be examined from two different angles in regards to genocide. There is the intervention that sustains regimes and militia through support – financial, politically or through the supply of manpower, weapons or training. China has been one of the Darfur government’s main suppliers of weapons for the last ten years (Reeves, 2007). Reeves also argues that China has indicated that they will prevent effective action by the United Nations. On the other hand, there is the lack of international intervention that fails to prevent genocide from occurring. This lack of intervention can arise for different reasons. Nations may be indifferent in regards to the plight of a group of people other than their own citizens if it does not affect them. President Clinton stated that the United States of America would not intervene in the Rwandan crisis as it did not pose a threat to American interests (Barker, 2004). Not only did the USA not intervene adequately in the genocide, they withdrew UN Peacekeeping troops who were already stationed in Rwanda. Nations may want to intervene but be restricted by bureaucratic obstacles. There are strict laws that are designed to regulate international intervention both by individual countries and groups such as the United Nations (Barker; Feil, 1998; Reeves). This was highlighted in Rwanda with Major General Dallaire unable to intervene in the situation (Barker; Feil).

All the genocides that have occurred throughout history have had their own unique characteristics, and the causes will always be far more complicated than can be portrayed on paper. However, a number of social psychological factors have been noted to combine to create the ‘perfect storm’ that leads to genocide. It can only be hoped, that through an understanding of these variables genocide can be prevented.



References

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Appendix A - Concept Map

Appendix B - Self Evaluation